In this paper, we study the design of core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions (CAs), a challenging setting where no strategyproof rules exist. We observe that in many real-world CAs, bidders are heterogeneous in size and value. Unfortunately, the rule most commonly used in practice, the Quadratic rule (Day and Cramton, 2012), significantly favors large over small bidders in terms of incentives as well as expected payoffs; this remains true even when normalizing to VCG payoffs. We first show analytically that in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the LLG domain, chosen here as in previous work for its tractably small size, the VCG-Discount-Small rule provides both much better incentives than the Quadratic rule and a fairer payoff distribution (as measured by our newly-defined Gini coefficents for payment rules). In a second step, we develop a general framework to design 75 new, and specify 9 existing, core-selecting rules built around different distance metrics, reference points, and bidder weightings. To measure the performance of these rules in realistically-sized CAs, we then develop a computational approach for finding approximate Bayes-Nash equilibria in CAs. We use this approach to study our rules in CAs with up to 25 items and 10 bidders. Based on this analysis, we ultimately recommend using one of our new rules: the Marginal-Economy-Fractional rule with VCG as the reference point. We find that this rule generally performs as well as or even slightly better than the Quadratic rule in terms of efficiency and revenue, but significantly improves upon it in terms of aggregate incentives and fairness. Clearly, we observe a large bidder heterogeneity in spectrum auctions conducted in practice. This raises the following questions: (1) Do some auction payment rules lead to an advantage for large bidders, while other rules lead to an advantage for small bidders? (2) Are there secondary effects on efficiency and revenue? (3) If different auction rules affect small and large bidders differently, what choice should a government make when selecting a particular payment rule for a government-run combinatorial auction? This leads us to study the "aggregate incentives" as well as the "fairness" of various core-selecting payment rules.
Introduction
The spectrum auctions conducted by governments around the world over the last twenty years are a true success story for market design in general and auction design in particular. Sophisticated mechanisms have been used to sell resources worth billions of dollars, forming the basis for today's wireless industry (Cramton, 2013) . Recent versions of these markets have used a combinatorial auction (CA) mechanism. The advantage of CAs (e.g., in contrast to running multiple single-item auctions) is that buyers can express complex valuation functions over bundles of goods. In this work, we focus on the payments that will be charged after the auction closes and the winners have been determined. Furthermore, we treat the CA as a one-shot game. 1 Thus, we study direct payment rules which take as input the bidders' value reports and compute payments for each of the winning bidders.
At first sight, the famous VCG mechanism may seem like an appealing payment rule for a CA because it is strategyproof. Unfortunately, VCG is generally viewed as unsuitable in a CA domain where items can be complements because it often produces outcomes outside of the core. Informally, this means that payments may be so low that a coalition of bidders may be willing to pay more in total than what the seller receives from the current winners. From a revenue perspective, VCG is also often deemed undesirable, because in a CA domain it can produce very low or even zero revenue, despite high competition for the goods in the auction. For this reason, recent auction designs have employed core-selecting payment rules (Day and Raghavan, 2007; Day and Milgrom, 2008) . The payment rule that is most commonly used in practice, the Quadratic rule proposed by Day and Cramton (2012) , selects prices that are (1) enforced to be in the core (with respect to the submitted bids), and within this (2) minimal in their total revenue to the seller, and then within this (3) minimal in the Euclidean distance to VCG prices.
Of course, because the Quadratic rule is a core-selecting payment rule, it is not strategyproof, and thus incentives for strategic bidding remain. Only recently has the research community started to graple with the incentive properties of the Quadratic rule. For the so-called Local-Local-Global setting, with 2 items and 3 bidders, Goeree and Lien (2014) as well as Ausubel and Baranov (2013) have recently derived the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Quadratic rule. It turns out that, even though the rule minimizes the Euclidean distance to VCG, large incentives to deviate remain in equilibrium. This motivates the search for better payment rules in this paper.
Bidder Heterogeneity in Real-world Spectrum Auctions
In this paper, we are particularly concerned with studying the "differential" effects of a payment rule on the bidders in an auction, assuming an anonymous auction mechanism (i.e., a mechanism that ignores the bidder identities). If the bidders in the auction were homogeneous (in terms of size, budgets, and values, etc.), then each bidder would, in expectation, have the same incentives, and also receive the same expected payoff. However, in real-word auctions, some bidders may be small (e.g., regional) bidders while other bidders may be large (e.g., national) bidders. Naturally, this heterogeneity in size translates into a heterogeneity of budgets, which translates into a heterogeneity of values for bundles of goods in the auction.
For example, an empirical analysis of the bidding data from the British 4G auction in 2013 has identified four heterogeneous classes of bidders (Kroemer, Bichler and Goetzendorf, 2015) . The two incumbents, Vodafone and Telefonica won the most valuable spectrum (800 MHz) that can be used to build out a nation-wide network with maximum reach, and they both paid over £550 Million for their allocations. In contrast, the much smaller bidder Niche Spectrum Ventures only won 2. 
Fairness: A Motivating Example
So far, we have focused our discussion on comparing the incentive properties of the Quadratic rule with other rules (e.g. the Small rule). In this section, we now provide a motivating example, to build some intuition for the "unfairness" of the Quadratic rule in terms of the payoff distribution it produces. Note that for the following example only (for illustrative purposes), we assume that the bidders submit their true values, and do not play their BNE strategies. All analyses in the rest of the paper will be in BNE.
Consider Table 1 , which contains one row for each of the bidders 1, 2 and 3. 6 The efficient allocation gives item A to bidder 1 and item B to bidder 2. VCG prices are p V CG 1 " 10 and p V CG 2 " 50, with payoffs of π V CG 1 " 40 and π V CG 2 " 100. We immediately see that VCG is outside the core (Day and Raghavan, 2007) : bidders 1 and 2 are only paying 60 in total for the two items A and B, which is less than the 100 offered by bidder 3, and thus a violation of the core. Clearly, this is unfair towards bidder 3 who is offering 100 for items that are sold for only 60.
The Quadratic Rule, presented next in Table 1 , corrects this unfairness present in VCG by choosing a price vector from the core, i.e. it picks a price vector with revenue at least 100, which is bidder 3's offer. Among such vectors the Quadratic Rule selects the one which is minimal in revenue and closest by the Euclidean distance to the VCG prices, i.e., in this example p Q 1 " 30 and p Q 2 " 70. Because the payment of both bidder 1 and 2 increased over that in VCG, their payoffs decreased to π Q 1 " 20 and π Q 2 " 80. Note, however, that this payoff decrease has impacted the two bidders unequally. Bidder 1 is left with only 50% of his VCG payoff, while bidder 2 retains 80% of his VCG payoff. This effect is expected under the Quadratic rule. Given a single core constraint the rule will increase the prices uniformly, starting from VCG, until the constraint is met. Naturally, this will decrease the relative payoffs, i.e. the payoffs as a fraction of VCG, of bidders with smaller VCG payoffs by more than those with larger payoffs. This leads to the observed unfairness of the Quadratic rule in terms of the relative payoffs of the winners, here between the small bidder (i.e., bidder 1) and the large bidder (i.e., bidder 2).
As we have seen, the Quadratic rule corrects the unfairness of VCG, by selecting payments in the core, but still leads to unequally distributed relative payoffs among the winners. In this paper, we offer a new fairness notion that goes beyond the core to account for this. An intuition for this is provided by the Fractional rule in Table 1 , with p M F 1 " 21.5 and p M F 2 " 78.5. Note that these prices still produce a revenue of 100 and are in the core. Yet, both bidders get the same fraction of their VCG payoff (roughly 71%). Thus, this rule has both the fairness of the core and the fairness of uniform relative payoffs at the same time. All else equal, we argue that it is therefore fairer than the Quadratic rule. But of course, our goal will be to find a payment rule that achieves this, not given truthful value reports by the bidders, but in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Measuring Fairness in Payoff Space via the Gini Coefficient
As we have seen in the motivating example presented in Table 1 , the three different payment rules (VCG, Quadratic, Fractional) produce different payoff distributions. But how do we now formally compare the payment rules regarding how fair they are? Obviously, we need a measure for the degree of fairness of a payment rule.
In this paper, we offer two such measures. We first consider a very basic, straight-forward measure of fairness: the standard Gini coefficient, as it is commonly used in Economics to compare the degree of (in-)equality of income within a country, for example. Concretely, we compute the Gini coefficient over the expected payoffs of all bidders. Computing this Gini coefficient can be done analytically (e.g., for small settings like the LLG domain) as well as numerically (for larger settings). The Gini coefficient provides us with a number between 0 and 100 for each payment rule, where a smaller number indicates a "fairer" payment rule. Thus, using this approach, we can compare the fairness of all payment rules that we consider in this paper.
One problem with applying the standard Gini in an auction domain with heterogeneous bidders is that we actually expect larger bidders (with larger values, who probably contribute more to social welfare) to obtain larger payoffs than smaller bidders. Such an unequal distribution of payoffs is absolutely fine and to be expected, in an auction domain with small and large bidders (in contrast to the income distribution within a country, which some may argue should not be too unequal). Thus, the standard gini may not be the only goal we should consider seeking when designin a core-selecting payment rule.
For this reason, we have also constructed a second fairness measure that is geared specifically towards measuring the fairness properties of payment rules in auctions with heterogeneous bidder populations: a VCG-based Gini coefficient. We argue that it is fine for differently-sized bidders to expect different payoffs, and that those should ideally be equal to their contribution to social welfare: a "maximally fair" payment rule would provide every bidder with payoffs equal to his social welfare. Of course, VCG is the unique mechanism that achieves this. More precisely, VCG is the unique mechanism with the following two properties:
1. Every bidder's payoff is his contribution to the social welfare.
2. Every bidder's payment is the externality he imposes on all other bidders.
Of course, when payments are required to be in the core, we are often not able to charge VCG payments anymore and thus bidders will not receive their VCG payoffs. In particular, because core revenues are generally higher than VCG revenues, the bidders' payoffs under a core-selecting mechanism will generally be lower than under VCG. However, a core-selecting payment rule can still provide each bidder with a certain fraction of his VCG payoff, with bidders obtaining a larger fraction of their payoff consequently receiving better treatment. 7 Using these fractions of VCG payoff, we adopt as our main fairness measure in this paper a perfectly balanced distribution of VCG payoff fractions across all bidders in the auction, as measured by a Gini coefficient (we detail our our precise method for calculating a Gini coefficient for payment rules in Section 4.4). Note that the Fractional rule in Table 1 had indeed maximal fairness according to this fairness measure (given truthful value reports), while the Quadratic rule did not. Of course the VCG mechanism always has perfect fairness, but in general produces payments that are outside the core.
In Section 8, where we evaluate our payment rules in Bayes-Nash equilibrium, we always provide the standard Gini as well as the VCG-based Gini. However, we will see that, surprisingly, the two measures lead to the same ranking of our rules in terms of fairness. In particular, across all domains that we study in this paper, the Small and Fractional rules (with various weightings and reference points) are much fairer than the Quadratic rule.
Comparing Payment Rules in Realistically-sized Combinatorial Auction Domains
As mentioned before, in this paper we develop a new new framework which enabled us to systematically evaluate 86 distinct payment rules for combinatorial auctions. This, of course, immediately brings up the question of what the right "evaluation method" should be. Because no strategyproof core-selecting payment rules exist, we must evaluate our payment rules in equilibrium. Much of the early work on core-selecting auctions has used a full-information Nash equilibrium analysis. However, we argue that the full information assumption is simply too unrealistic for practical settings, in particular for large combinatorial auctions with many heterogeneous bidders. For this reason we adopt a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) analysis to evaluate and compare our payment rules.
So far, we have only talked about about our analytical results for the LLG setting, for which the BNE of the Quadratic rule was also known before. However, we are also interested in understanding the performance of our rules in realistically-sized auction domains. Unfortunately, analytically deriving the BNE quickly becomes intractable when going beyond the LLG setting.
For this reason, we have developed and implemented a computational approach to find an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium for our payment rules. More concretely, we have developed an algorithm, based on fictitious play, which takes as input a payment rule and a domain generator (i.e., a simulator for a combinatorial auction domain), and then searches for an ε-BNE. Using this approach, we can find an approximate BNE for domains with 25 items and 10 multi-minded bidders on a high-performance machine within approximately 12 hours. Of course, we used a compute cluster to parallelize this computation for all the payment rules and domains we have studied.
Overview of Contributions
Our ultimate contribution in this paper is a new payment rule, the Marginal-Economy-Fractional rule, which outperforms the Quadratical rule, and strikes the best balance along all of our performance criteria. To get there, we offer: 1. A new framework for the design of core-selecting payment rules, and two fairness measures based on the Gini coefficient for evaluating payment rules.
2. The design of 75 new rules that have not been studied before, built around various (i) distance metrics, (ii) reference points, and (iii) bidder weightings.
A set of novel Marginal
Economy weights that perform almost as well as reserve price weights but without requiring a priori knowledge on the part of the seller. 5. An algorithm for computationally finding approximate BNEs in realistically-sized core-selecting CAs.
A theoretical
6. Extensive experimental results using our computational BNE approach, comparing 85 different rules in terms of efficiency, aggregate incentives, fairness, and revenue.
We find that, in BNE, the Quadratic rule is outperformed by many of our new rules in terms of aggregate incentives and fairness, while efficiency is generally high for all rules. Additionally, we show that the minimum-revenue-core (MRC) constraint, typically included in today's core-selecting CAs, only has a minor effect in equilibrium. After reviewing all results, we find that one rule is the best all-rounder: the Marginal-Economy-Fractional rule with VCG as the reference point. We find that this rule generally performs as well as or even slightly better than the Quadratic rule in terms of efficiency and revenue, but significantly improves upon it in terms of aggregate incentives and fairness.
Related Work
Over the last 15 years, there has been a large literature on the design of bidding languages, clearing algorithms, and activity rules for use in combinatorial auctions (CAs) (Cramton, Shoham and Steinberg, 2006) . But finding optimal payment rules, the focus of our paper, has turned out to be somewhat elusive. Early proposals for CAs typically considered VCG prices (Varian and MacKie-Mason, 1994) . However, as has been pointed out in the literature (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006) , there are numerous issues with VCG, most notably that it may result in arbitrarily low revenue to the seller. This observation has led to considerable interest in core-selecting combinatorial auctions in recent years (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002; Milgrom, 2007; Day and Milgrom, 2008) .
Unfortunately, there exists no strategyproof core-selecting payment rule, and thus, designing an "optimal" core-selecting rule is a challenging market design problem. Othman and Sandholm (2010) avoid this issue by assuming participants bid so as to minimize envy instead of maximize profit. Instead, we follow the line of research that has made the more common assumption that bidders seek to maximize profit. In this direction, Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) were the first to introduce the idea of finding prices that minimize some distance metric to VCG, first for combinatorial exchanges, and later for CAs (Parkes, 2002) . Since then, a small number of CA payment rules have been proposed that minimize some distance metric to VCG (Day and Raghavan, 2007) , or to other reference points (Erdil and Klemperer, 2010) . Ultimately, Day and Cramton (2012) proposed the Quadratic rule, and this is also the rule most often used in practice today. We will describe all of the payment rules and explain the origins of the underlying ideas in detail in Section 6.6.
Even though the Quadratic rule has now been used for about 5 years by multiple governments to allocate resources worth Billions of dollars, we still have an incomplete understanding of this rule. For example, the only Bayes-Nash equilibrium results we have for the Quadratic rule are for highly stylized settings with two items and three bidders (Goeree and Lien, 2014; Ausubel and Baranov, 2013) . In this paper, we begin by analyzing two of the most important alternatives to Quadratic in the same stylized setting. Then, to study core-selecting rules in larger settings, where it is infeasible to obtain analytical BNEs, we compute approximate BNEs, following earlier work by Lubin and Parkes (2009) who have evaluated pricing rules for combinatorial exchanges via computational BNE approximations. Our computational techniques build on this approach, as well as earlier work from Reeves and Wellman (2004) and Vorobeychik and Wellman (2008) .
Preliminaries

Formal Model
In a combinatorial auction (CA), there is a set M of m distinct, indivisible items, and a set N of n bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation function v i which, for every bundle of items S Ď M , defines bidder i's value v i pSq P R, i.e., the maximum amount that bidder i would be willing to pay for S. To simplify notation, we assume that the seller has zero value for all items, although our setup extends to the case where the seller has non-zero value (see Day and Cramton (2012) for how to handle reserve prices).
We let p " pp 1 , ..., p n q denote the payment vector, with p i denoting bidder i's payment. We assume that bidders have quasi-linear utility functions, i.e., u i pS, p i q " v i pSq´p i . Bidders make reports about their values to the mechanism, denotedv i pSq, which may be non-truthful (i.e.,v i ‰ v i q. Following existing work in this area (Goeree and Lien, 2014; Ausubel and Baranov, 2013) , we assume that bidders only bid on items for which they have a positive value. We define an allocation X " pX 1 , . . . , X n q Ď M n as a vector of bundles, with X i Ď M being the bundle that i gets allocated. A mechanism's allocation rule maps the bidders' reports to an allocation. We only consider allocation rules that maximize reported social welfare, yielding an allocation X˚" arg max X ř iPNv i pX i q, subject to X being feasible, i.e., Ş Xi " H. In addition to the allocation rule, a mechanism also specifies a payment rule, defining prices. Together, these define the outcome O " xX, py. An outcome O is called individually rational (IR) if, @i: u i pX i , p i q ě 0.
VCG, Payoff, and Discount
The famed VCG mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) generalizes the well-known second-price auction:
Definition 1 (VCG). The VCG mechanism chooses the allocation X˚that maximizes the bidders' reported social welfare, and then charges each bidder i its marginal cost to the economy, i.e., the externality he imposes on all other bidders. Formally:
where X´i is the welfare-maximizing allocation when all bidders except i are present.
VCG is social-welfare maximizing and strategyproof, i.e., it is a dominant strategy for every bidder to report his true value v i . Every payment rule other than VCG we consider in this paper will not be strategyproof, and thus we will in general have to differentiate between a bidder's true value v i and his reported valuev i .
Definition 2 (Payoff). Given a payment p i charged by a particular payment rule, a bidder's payoff is the bidder's profit evaluated at his true value, i.e.,
Definition 3 (Discount). A bidder's reported VCG discount (or just discount) is the difference between its reported value and its VCG payment:
Note that payoff and discount are only the same (in equilibrium) if VCG is used as the actual payment rule; otherwise they are different. The payoff is what a bidder actually cares about and where is the discount captures the "revealed payoff" the bidder would have gotten if VCG had instead been used in place of the actual payment rule. We will later use the discount for the design of our payment rules to weight the bidders's bids. 
The Core
In CAs where some items are complements, VCG prices may lie outside the core. Informally, this means that a coalition of bidders is willing to pay more than what the seller receives from the current winners. To avoid such undesirable outcomes, recent designs have employed payment rules that restrict prices to be in the core, giving rise to core-selecting payment rules (Day and Milgrom, 2008) .
Definition 4 (Core Prices). We let W denote the set of winners, X˚the welfare-maximizing allocation, C Ď N denotes a coalition of bidders, and X C is the allocation that would be chosen by the mechanism if only the bidders in the coalition C were be present. Then, a price vector p is in the core, if, in addition to individual rationality, the following set of core constraints hold:
Note that enforcing prices to be in the core puts lower bounds (constraints) on the payments of the winners, where each coalition of bidders leads to one core constraint. Intuitively, the winners' payments must be sufficiently large, such that there exists no coalition that is willing to pay more to the seller than the current winners' payments. In a CA with complements, VCG prices are often outside the core and, in the worst case, VCG may generate zero revenue despite high competition for the goods. See Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the core, based on the motivating example from Section 1.3.
In this example, we immediately see that VCG prices are outside the core. Additionally, we also display the price vectors that would be chosen by the Quadratic rule (which we describe next), as well as the Large, Small, and Fractional rules (which we describe in Sections 5 and 6.4). Note that the distance between VCG and the core can vary significantly depending on the bidders' bids (i.e., from one auction to another). In our experiments, we found that this distance has a significant impact on how fair different payment rules are, and, not surprisingly, how much revenue they generate (see Section 8.4).
Remark 1 (True vs. Revealed Core). Note that the core is defined in terms of bidders' true values. However, given that no strategyproof core-selecting CA exists, we must expect bidders to be non-truthful. Goeree and Lien (2014) have recently shown that the outcome of a core-selecting CA can be outside the true core in a BNE. Thus, core-selecting CAs only guarantee to produce outcomes in the revealed core, i.e., in the core with respect to reported values. Going forward, whenever we talk about the core, or core-selecting rules, we always mean the revealed core, unless we state it otherwise. Note that for the auctioneer (e.g., the government), having prices in the revealed core is typically want she wants, because this protects the auctioneer against law-suits from losing bidders and from the appearance that an unacceptably large amount of revenue was left on the table.
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
For the analysis of auction payment rules we assume that the bidders know their own value function, but do not have full information about the other bidders' value functions. Instead, bidders only have distributional information regarding the other bidders' value functions. Thus, the appropriate equilibrium concept to analyze auction payment rules is the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium. For the following definition, we let s i denote bidder i's strategy, which is a mapping from his true value function v i to a possibly non-truthful reportv i . Given a value function and a strategy from each bidder, this determines the outcome of the auction. Thus, we can let u i ps 1 pv 1 q, s 2 pv 2 q, . . . , s n pv ndenote bidder i's utility for the outcome of the auction. We use v´i to denote the value functions of all bidders except i, and analogously for the strategies s´i:
Definition 5 (Bayes-Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile s˚" ps1, . . . , snq is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) in a sealed-bid auction if, for all bidders i, and all values functions
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution over the other bidders' value functions.
In words, a bidder's BNE strategy is an optimal strategy (a mapping of true value functions to reported value functions) given his belief regarding the other bidders' value functions. With this background, we turn to describing the key desiderata for payment rules in the core-selecting CA setting.
Design Goals
We strive for the following five objectives when designing payment rules, in this order: (1) high efficiency, (2) payments in the core, (3) good incentives, (4) good fairness properties, and (5) high revenue. Obviously, trade-offs are necessary.
High Efficiency
From a social planner's perspective (e.g., a government auctioning off wireless spectrum) it is desirable to maximize social welfare, i.e., efficiency. Of course, the efficiency of our payment rules must be evaluated in BNE, and thus we consider the expected efficiency in BNE. Our measure for efficiency is the expected welfare of the mechanism divided by the expected welfare of the optimal allocation. Formally, given an auction instance I, let SW OP T pIq denote the social welfare obtained under the optimal allocation given bidders' true values (which is equal to the social welfare that would be achieved by VCG). Let SW M pIq denote the social welfare obtained by the mechanism M when all bidders play their BNE strategies. We define the efficiency of mechanism M as:
where the expectation is taken over the auction instances given a particular domain generator. This is the standard definition of efficiency used in prior work, e.g., by Goeree and Lien (2014) . 8 Of course, we could simply use VCG to achieve the maximally efficient allocation. However, as discussed in the introduction, VCG outcomes are often outside the core, and finding payments inside the core is also one of our design goals. 9 Thus, maximizing efficiency in BNE is our first non-trivial design goal.
Payments in the Core
We strive for payments in the core, such that no coalition of bidders is willing to deviate from the mechanism. The core is desirable for multiple reasons: (1) it provides an anti-collusion property, which protects the auctioneer from potential law-suits;
(2) as Day and Raghavan (2007) have argued, the core provides a certain notion of fairness, because it guarantees that when the auction closes, no coalition of bidders can argue (and sue the auctioneer) that it would have been willing to pay more than the current winners. Note that some researchers have also argued in favor of the core on the basis of revenue considerations. However, we will show in Section 8.4, that core-selecting payment rules do not necessarily lead to a large revenue increase in equilibrium.
Good Aggregate Incentives
We next desire that our payment rules produce "good incentives". Because there is no strategyproof core-selecting CA, and thus, all of our rules are necessarily non-strategyproof, there will remain strategic opportunities for the participants. However, we would like these opportunities in BNE to be as small as possible. This helps unsophisticated players who play truthfully instead of playing optimally, because they will suffer less if their BNE strategy is closer to playing truthful, and in general makes the game easier for participants to play. Furthermore, from an "approximate strategyproofness" point of view, smaller opportunities to manipulate in BNE are also better: one can take the viewpoint that an agent who can only gain very little (in BNE) may not want to manipulate at all. To make this notion of "good aggregate incentives" concrete, we define the aggregate incentives for bidders to strategize as the Euclidean distance between their truthful value and their bid in BNE, normalized by their truthful value. The normalization will make the measure robust to the distribution of value in the domain. Formally we have:
Definition 6 (Aggregate Incentives).
where the L 2 measure is taken over all observed values.
We note that in Section 5, we will use a continuous version of this measure; later in Section 8, where bidders are organized by class, we will use a discretized version.
Fairness: Gini Coefficients for Payment Rules
As we have motivated in Section 1.3, the core only provides a minimal fairness guarantee ("no-groupenvy"), but says little about the distribution of winners' payoffs. In this section, we define two such measures. While any measure of statistical dispersion might be employed, we use the Gini coefficient, which is often used for this purpose in the economics literature. Accordingly, we define a "Standard" Gini measure over these payoffs as:
Definition 7 (Standard Gini). Given a vector of participant payoffs π R , we define the Standard Gini as the unweighted Gini coefficient computed on these values (Jasso, 1979) . Here π R i refers to agent i's payoff under rule R in the approximate BNE of rule R.
Gini coefficients are between 0 and 100: a Gini of 0 implies perfect fairness and a Gini of 100 implies perfect unfairness over the quantity of comparison.
However, because the Gini is generally used to measure wealth inequality, some care must be used in applying it to our more complex setting. We believe the payoff obtained under the rule to be the most natural analogy to "wealth" in our setting, but it is certainly not the only quantity we might wish to consider. Specifically, as we have argued in Section 1.4, this is not the only measure of fairness that we may wish to consider. We may also reasonably wish to adopt VCG as our gold standard in terms of fairness, even as it is one that is not achievable within the core. We might then wish to determine to what degree our core-selecting payment rules allocate to participants the same fraction of their VCG payoff, and use this is our fairness target:
Definition 8 (Fraction of VCG Payoff). Given bidder i's VCG payoff π V CG i and his payoff under rule R, i.e., π R i , we define bidder i's fraction of VCG payoff as:
Where π V CG i refers to agent i's VCG payoff given truthful value reports (the BNE of VCG), while π R i refers to agent i's payoff under rule R in the approximate BNE of rule R.
Accordingly, we will now quantify the degree to which a payment rule achieves this notion of fairness by seeking a balanced distribution of VCG payoff fractions across the bidders. To begin, we use the standard measure to capture the fairness of the winning bidders as follows:
Definition 9 (Winners' Gini). Given a vector of the fractions of VCG payoffs, i.e., γ " pγ 1 , . . . , γ n q, we define the Winners' Gini for γ as the Gini coefficient computed on the set of bidders who are winners under both rules, R and V CG:
where G is the standard unweighted Gini coefficient (Jasso, 1979) and W R and W V CG are the sets of winners under R and VCG respectively.
In practice, we draw a large number of bidders i from our domain of interest, i.e. we run a vary large number of auctions (100, 000) to produce γ.
Note, however, that the Winners' Gini covers only those bidders who are winning under both, the rule R and VCG. To get a handle on what fraction of bidders this represents, we also consider the following:
Definition 10 (Winner Change Rate). Given W V CG , i.e., the set of winners under VCG, and W R , i.e., the set of winners under R, we define the Winner Change Rate of R:
This is the fraction of bidders who winners under one rule but not the other, otherwise known as as the Jaccard distance d J pW V CG , W R q.
The bidders captured by the Winner Change Rate are precisely those that create a maximal unfairness, because their fraction of VCG payoff is either 0 or 8.
Ultimately, we can combine the Winners' Gini and the Winner Change Rate into a single fairness measure for all bidders:
Definition 11 (VCG Gini). Given a vector of the fractions of VCG payoffs, i.e., γ " pγ 1 , . . . , γ n q, we define the VCG Gini for γ as:
The VCG Gini captures the Winners' Gini for those bidders in W R X W V CG , and assigns a Gini of 100 explicitly to those bidders in tW
The VCG Gini provides a single fairness number for a payment rule R that captures both, the change in the winners' between VCG and the rule R, as well as the distribution of the fractions of VCG payoffs among the winners under R.
High revenue
When choosing between different rules, various design goals are possible, including the natural goal of maximizing revenue. However, in this paper we are primarily interested in fairness-maximizing payment rules, and not revenue-maximizing rules. If the seller wanted to achieve especially high revenue, she would have to use well-chosen reserve prices anyway, which of course would require distributional information about bidders' values. Because this is not the focus of this paper, we do not consider using reserve prices to increase revenue in this work. However, all else equal, i.e., given two core-selecting payment rules with similar efficiency and fairness properties, we would prefer a rule with higher rather than lower revenue. Still, in our evaluations, a comparison by revenue will generally be secondary.
Theoretical Analysis of the Quadratic, Small and Large Rules
In this section, we present the canonical form of three of the most important payment rules we consider: the Quadratic, Small and Large rules, as schematically illustrated in Figure 1 . Here we will rapidly introduce each of these rules; a more general and formal definition of the rules is deferred to Section 6. After presenting the existing BNE results for the Quadratic rule for the tractably-small LLG domain (Ausubel and Baranov, 2013; Goeree and Lien, 2014) , we then find the BNE of the Small and Large rule analytically in this domain as well. Then we compare the efficiency, aggregate incentives, fairness and revenue of all three rules in BNE for the LLG setting.
The LLG Setting
Bayes-Nash equilibria of core-selecting payment rules are very complex to study analytically, which is why theoretical results only exist for a very small settings. Existing theoretical results have been derived for the Local-Local-Global (LLG) setting. In this setting, there exist two items A and B, and three bidders. Two of the bidders are local bidders, with one of them only interested in item A, and one of them only interested in item B. The third bidder is the global bidder who is interested in both items A and B. In this set-up the global bidder has a weakly dominant strategy to bid truthful. However, the local bidders have an incentive to "shade" their bids.
The Quadratic Rule
The Quadratic rule is the payment rule that has been used in many of the spectrum auctions in North America and Europe over the past five years (Day and Cramton, 2012) :
Definition 12 (Quadratic Rule). The unique Quadratic Rule price vector is chosen to be:
1. Within the core (defined with respect to reported values).
2. Within this, minimal in the L 1 (Manhattan) norm, the so called minimal revenue core (MRC), an idea first put forward by Day and Raghavan (2007) .
3. Within this minimal in the L 2 (Euclidean) distance to the VCG payments, 10 an idea first put forward by Day and Cramton (2012) .
We next briefly review the most important existing theoretical results on the Quadratic rule that are relevant for our paper. Goeree and Lien (2014) derive the BNE for the specific set-up where the value of the global bidder is uniformly distributed on [0,2] and the value of the local bidders are uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Importantly, all values are drawn independently from each other, and are uncorrelated. They show the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Goeree and Lien (2014); Ausubel and Baranov (2013) ). The Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Quadratic rule with uncorrelated bids is for the global bidder to bid truthful, and for the local bidders to bid:v " maxp0, v´p3´2
?
2qq « maxp0, v´0.17q (11) Thus, the Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies of the local bidders require an additive shading of their values in this uncorrelated LLG setting. Ausubel and Baranov (2013) have also studied the LLG setting with uniformly distributed values. However, they extend the analysis towards settings with correlated bidders, which turns out to change the structure of the BNE strategies.
Proposition 2 (Ausubel and Baranov (2013) ). The Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Quadratic rule with perfectly correlated local bidders is for the global bidder to bid truthful, and for the local bidders to bid:v
Thus, it turns out that in this setting, the Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies of the local bidders require a multiplicative shading of their values. Ausubel and Baranov (2013) also derive Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies for LLG settings with partial correlation which will induce the local bidders to shade both additively and multiplicatively according to a more complicated formula we omit here for brevity.
Auxiliary Proof Concepts for the LLG Setting
Prior to turning to our novel investigations of the Small and Large rules in the LLG setting, we pause to adopt several definitions and a key lemma from Ausubel and Baranov (2013) that we will find useful for our work in the LLG setting:
Definition 13 (Components of the LLG domain).
• Let i and j be the local agents, and g be the global agent.
• Let p i pv i ,v j ,v g q be the payments for i under a given payment rule and reportsv i ,v j andv g
be the marginal probability of winning, under reportv i .
• Let βpvq denote the symmetrical bid function for the local agents mapping from value v to report v
With these definitions one can obtain:
Lemma 1 (Ausubel and Baranov (2013) Lemmas 0-3). For an MRC-selecting auction using the reported welfare-maximizing allocation rule a BNE in the uncorrelated LLG setting is defined by the following bid functions:
•v g " v g for the global agent g
•v i " maxp0, v i´M P i pv i q φpv ifor local agent i if φpv i q ą 0, and symmetrically for j.
These definitions and lemma will facilitate our novel analysis of the class-symmetric BNE in the LLG setting for alternatives to the Quadratic rule, such as the Small and Large payment rules that we consider next. Because we seek analytical results, we remain in the tractable LLG domain for this analysis following the existing literature on the Quadratic rule; we will later use a computational approach to find approximate BNEs in a realistically-sized combinatorial auction domain in Section 8.
Small Rule
The Small rule was defined for a Combinatorial Exchange (CE) domain by Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) . Following the Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso approach, in this section we specify the rule in terms of VCG discounts; in the next section we will generalize this to consider rules with a similar but more expansive structure, and built around alternative quantities. By replacing the budget-balance constraint of the CE domain with the core constraints, we arrive at the following rule that is appropriate for a core-selecting CA domain:
Definition 14 (Small Rule). The unique Small Rule price vector p is chosen to be:
2. (optional) Within this, minimal in the L 1 (Manhattan) norm, i.e. within the MRC.
3. Within this, minimal in their inverse discount-weighted total payments: ∆´1¨p.
4. Within this minimal in the L 2 (Euclidean) distance to the VCG payments, used to break ties such that payments are unique.
The sorting in step 3 chooses a payment vector that charges players with small discounts as little as possible, and those with large discounts as much as possible consistent with the core constraints. To the degree discounts correlate with values, these incentive effects will then translate to bidders with small and large value as well. For this rule, we obtain the following result in the LLG setting:
Theorem 1 (Small Rule in LLG). A Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Small rule with uncorrelated local bidders is for the global bidder to bid truthful, and for the local bidders to bid:
v " 2 lnˆ3
3´v˙ ( 13) Proof. We first note that the Small rule by definition selects an MRC outcome and thus that Lemma 1 is applicable. The global bidder thus bids truthful in the BNE. Let us also assume thatv i andv j are between 0 and 1, i.e. we restrict to BNEs with bid functions that map in this range. Then φpv i q " 1 2 and the local bid function is defined by:
Now assuming a symmetric bid function βpvq we can write:
nd following Lemma 1:
his integral equation can be solved by the function βpvq " 2 lnˆ3 3´vȧ nd we note that for v P p0, 1q, βpvq P p0, 1q.
Large Rule
The Large rule was also defined in Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) . It is the opposite of the Small rule, with payments biased towards players with small discounts instead of large ones (i.e. with the sort in step 3 reversed, as the discount is not inverted):
Definition 15 (Large Rule). The unique Large Rule price vector p is chosen to be:
3. Within this, minimal in their discount-weighted payments: ∆¨p.
For this rule, we obtain the following result in the LLG setting:
Theorem 2 (Large Rule in LLG). A Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Large rule with uncorrelated local bidders is for the global bidder to bid truthful, and for the local bidders to bid:
v " maxp0, 2¨lnp1`vq´cq (14) c " lnp4q´2¨Wˆ´1 2¨e
where W denotes the product log function.
Proof. We first note that the Large rule by definition selects an MRC outcome and thus that Lemma 1 is applicable. The global bidder thus bids truthful in the BNE. Let us also assume thatv i andv j are between 0 and 1, i.e. restrict to BNEs with bid functions that map in this range. Then φpv i q " 1 2 and the local bid function is defined by:
Additionally note that
This integral equation can be solved by the function
nd we note that for v P p0, 1q, βpvq P p0, 1q. Figure 2 plots the BNE strategies of the local players in the LLG setting for each of the rules discussed so far (recall that the global player always plays truthful in the LLG setting). From the figure we can nicely see that the Small rule induces a strategy that, while slightly convex, is approximately multiplicative. The Quadratic rule is less truthful, with its significant additive offset. The Large rule has an even larger additive offset, combined with a slightly concave and steeper sequel. We can quantify these observations by calculating the aggregate incentives and fairness measures we defined in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, as provided in Table 5 .6. From the table it is clear that the Small rule is providing the best aggregate incentives, the fairest outcomes, the highest revenue, and the highest efficiency among the three core-selecting payment rules. Note that the Quadratic rule achieves even lower revenue than VCG (as has been noted before by Goeree and Lien (2014) and Ausubel and Baranov (2013) ), which illustrates our point that "high revenue" is not a good motivation for using a core-selecting payment rule (instead, well-chosen reserve prices should be employed). Surprisingly, the Small rule is the only core-selecting rule that achieves revenue higher than VCG in this setting.
Comparison of Analytical Results
These results demonstrate that even in a small setting such as LLG, with very homogeneous bidders, we can already identify very stark differences between the three different payment rules (Quadratic, Large, and Small). However, note that these three rules are only representatives of a much larger design space that one can consider. Therefore, in the next section, we develop a general framework for the design of core-selecting payment rules, to ultimately identify one that performs optimally along multiple dimensions, in particular efficiency, aggregate incentives, and fairness.
Rule
Aggregate Table 2 : The aggregate incentives, fairness, revenue and efficiency in the LLG setting of each of the rules according to the BNE that has been analytically determined.
A General Framework for Designing Core-Selecting Payment Rules
In the previous section we studied examples of alternatives to the Quadratic rule that could improve upon it in the restricted case of the LLG domain. In this section we now develop a general framework for designing core-selecting payment rules, that encompasses all of the 84 core-selecting CA payment rules we design in this paper, and subsequently evaluate in a more expansive domain.
The pricing problem
The pricing problem (finding a particular price vector p) of a core-selecting auction can be formulated as the following mathematical program:
arg min
The functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k : R nˆRn Ñ R are objective functions which minimize some distance between the price vector p and the reference points p˚, 1 , p˚, 2 , ..., p˚, k . These objective functions are evaluated in order, i.e.,with f 1 being the primary objective, f 2 the secondary, etc. Because this is a sequence of objectives, k programs must be solved in sequence, where only f k is included in each program and the constraints on p resulting from all f i , i ă k, are included as constraints in program k. Equation 17 ensures we produce core-selecting prices. While there can in theory be exponentially many core constraints (one for each coalition of bidders), constraint generation typically limits the required number to only a few. Day and Raghavan (2007) were the first to propose a core constraint generation algorithm which made running core-selecting CAs feasible for real-world sized auctions. Recently, Bünz, Seuken and Lubin (2015) further improved this algorithm leading to an additional speed-up. The reference points p˚, 1 , p˚, 2 , etc., used in the objective functions, can be any arbitrary price vectors within or below the core. Multiple authors have discussed the impact of using different reference points and this remains an important open research question (Erdil and Klemperer, 2010; Day and Cramton, 2012) . In our experiments, we primarily focus on using VCG payments as the reference point p˚. We additionally also consider 0, as well as reserve prices set by the seller, both of which are independent of bidders' value reports.
As an illustrative example, consider the Quadratic rule (with the MRC), which requires solving a mathematical program with two objective functions: f 1 first minimizes the L 1 distance to 0, and then f 2 minimizes the L 2 distance to the VCG price vector.
Characterizing Payment Rules By Distance Measures
In general, the objective functions f 1 to f k can represent arbitrary distance measures between a reference point p˚and the payment vector p. Here, we consider weighted generalizations of the metrics obtained from the Lebesgue L ρ norms. Following a common slight abuse of terminology we will often refer to the distance metric implied by the L ρ norm as the L ρ metric. The weighted form we use is as follows:
This is the standard Lebesgue metric, augmented by a set of weights w P R n and a simple function ψ : R Ñ R which is applied to each weight element-wise. 11 If a particular payment rule is not guaranteed to result in unique prices in a core-selecting CA setting, then we break ties by further minimizing the L 2 distance to p˚as our final objective.
Standard Lebesgue Metrics and the Minimum Revenue Core
We first consider a number of unweighted Lebesgue metrics, i.e., where ψpxq " x, and w " 1 in Equation 18 . First, we consider the L 2 distance, which gives rise to the Quadratic rule we have already looked at in detail. Next we consider the L 8 distance, which captures the largest element-wise difference between p and p˚. This metric gives rise to the Threshold rule introduced by Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) . Finally, we consider the L 1 distance, which captures the sum of the absolute differences between payments in p and p˚. Day and Raghavan (2007) argued for selecting prices in the core that are minimal in revenue, the so-called Minimum Revenue Core (MRC). In our framework, this is equivalent to minimizing the L 1 distance to 0. Most rules used in practice also include a restriction to the MRC. Consequently, for every payment rule, we have studied both a version with and without MRC (i.e., with and without an initial L 1 minimization).
Weighted Metrics
In addition to the standard L ρ metrics, we also investigate the weighted metrics introduced by Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) in the combinatorial exchange (CE) domain. In a CE, each rule can be defined not only in terms of a distance metric but also in terms of an equivalent algorithmic process. The algorithmic definitions are not available for core-selecting payment rules, because the core constraints bind in ways that are orthogonal to how the algorithms compute prices. However, we can still obtain useful intuitions about the effects of these weighted metrics by appealing to their algorithmic definitions (as captured in their names), as follows:
1. The Small rule is defined as an L 1 measure, but with ψpxq " x´1. 12 It favors players with small weights, trying to set their payments to the reference point (or as close to the reference points as the core constraints will allow), while "large" bidders are charged payments as close as possible to their value-reports. This rule has the virtue of maximally removing the strategic incentive from the smallest players. While it may seem unfair to bias the rule for some players and against others, market power does this already so the rule can be viewed as a way to push back against this built-in bias.
2. The Large rule is also based on L 1 , but with ψpxq " x, the identity function. It is the inverse of the Small rule, i.e., it attempts to set the prices of "large" bidders to the reference point and of "small" bidders to their value-report.
3. The Fractional rule also uses ψpxq " x´1, like the Small rule, but it uses an L 2 measure instead of L 1 . Thus, while the Small rule essentially produces a lexicographic ordering of the bidders (based on their weights), the Fractional rule is more balanced. In this sense, the Fractional rule can be seen as a balanced version of the Small rule. 11 Since arg min x f pxq " arg min x gpf pxqq for all strictly monotonic functions g, we can in practice minimize pfiq ρ in our price optimization instead of fi. This is particularly helpful since pfiq ρ is a convex function. 12 To avoid division by 0, we Winsorize the weights to their smallest non-zero value.
Weights for Weighted Metrics
The Small, Large, and Fractional rules all use weights to bias payments in favor of certain bidders. It remains to identify which weights to use:
1. VCG Discount Weighting uses the VCG discount for weights, i.e. w i " ∆ i . These were the weights introduced in the original Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) work, and were chosen because it is ultimately the discounts that are set via the payment rules. However, our results will show that using weights based on payments, reserve prices, as well as imputed values are more effective.
2. VCG Payment Weighting uses the VCG payments (calculated based on bidders' reports) as the weights in the mechanism, i.e. w i " p V CG i . This is a new approach we introduce in this paper, and we will show that it outperforms weighting by discount.
3. Reserve Price Weighting uses a set of reserve prices set by the seller as weights, i.e. w i " p RP i . This approach has been proposed by Baranov (2010) , and used in practice in the recent Canadian bandwidth auction (Licensing Framework, n.d.) . This can be an effective weighting method, but it heavily relies on the seller actually having reasonable reserve prices, which is often not the case because no good distributional information about bidders' values is available.
Marginal Economy (ME)
Weighting is a novel set of weights we propose in this paper, denoted
The idea of marginal economy weighting is to (a) obtain much of the benefit of reserve price weighting, without (b) actually requiring the seller to have good distributional information to compute reserve prices. We now describe this approach in more detail.
The main idea of marginal economy weighting is to compute weights based on an estimate of bidders' values, instead of using bidders' discounts or VCG payments. Because using a bidder's own bid as information about his value for a bundle would open up too many avenues for strategic manipulation, we will instead impute an estimate of a bidder's value for his winning bundle, based on the other bidders' bids. The idea is similar to the construction of VCG payoffs, which as we have discussed before, are always equal to a bidder's marginal contribution to the economy. Here, we instead find a reasonable estimate for the value of the bidder's winning bundle based on the bids of all other bidders.
Towards this end, we propose the following heuristic: we use the highest value of the bundle in the marginal economy, i.e., considering all bidders except the bidder being priced. Such a value has the virtue of not being directly manipulable by the bidder being priced. When the marginal economy contains at least one bid for the same allocation as the bundle being priced, then we can use this losing bid for the marginal economy value. However, this will often not be the case, forcing us to impute a value for the bundle from the bids that are in the marginal economy. In the present work, we adopt the following simple heuristic to compute these imputed values for Marginal Economy Weighting:
That is, for each good g in bidder i's winning bundle (that needs to be priced), we calculate the maximum per-good value across all marginal-economy bidders. Then we set the weight to be the sum of each of these per-good prices. We find that this weighting function can be highly effective in increasing both incentives and fairness, which we will show empirically in Section 8.
Payment Rule Name Metric ψpwq Reference Metric ψpwq Reference Metric ψpwq Reference
able 3: Here we provide the sequence of metrics and weights that define each of our payment rules. For each rule we use three different reference points p˚P tp V CG , p RP , 0u. For the weighted rules (Large, Small, Fractional) we use four different weights w P t∆, p V CG , p RP , p M E u. Note that for the Threshold, Large and Small rules, the final L 2 metric is included only for tie-breaking purposes (as indicated by :).
Parameterized Framework for all Payment Rules
The degrees of freedom outlined in the preceding sections have provided us with 3 weighted metrics (Small, Large, Fractional), 4 weights for these weighted metrics (∆, p V CG , p RP , p M E ), 2 additional non-weighted rules (Quadratic and Threshold), 3 reference points (p V CG , p RP , 0q, and the option to use MRC or not for any of our rules. In total, this leads to 84 different core-selecting payment rules:
Weighted Metrics loooooooooomoooooooooon¨W eights looomooon`( Quadratic, Threshold) loooooooooooooomoooooooooooooon¯¨R eference Points looooooooomooooooooon¨(MRC,MRC) looooooomoooooooń 3¨4`2¯¨3¨2 " 84 Table 3 provides an overview of all payment rules we have studied. For each rule, we provide its name, and describe the sequence of metrics and weights that define it.
Remark 2. Out of the 84 rules described in Table 3 , only 9 have been explicitly proposed and studied by other researchers before. We now briefly discuss each of those in turn to put the origins of these rules and the underlying ideas into context. Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) were the first to suggest using distance-to-VCG-based payment rules in combinatorial settings. They proposed the (1) Threshold rule (without MRC), originally for the CE domain, and later for the CA domain (Parkes, 2002) . Then Day and Raghavan (2007) suggested to first enforce prices to be in the MRC, and proposed the (2) MRC Threshold rule. Because minimizing the L 8 distance to VCG does not guarantee unique prices in CAs, Day and Cramton (2012) refined this approach and proposed the (3) MRC Quadratic rule, which is the rule currently used in practice.
In the original work by Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) , they also proposed the three weighted rules, but only in combination with the VCG-discount weights, giving rise to the (4) ∆-Large, (5) ∆-Small, and (6) ∆-Fractional rules. Recently, Baranov (2010) proposed to use the Fractional rule in combination with reserve price weighting, giving rise to the (7) p RP -Fractional rule. Finally, Erdil and Klemperer (2010) and Day and Cramton (2012) have both investigated using reference points (in combination with MRC Quadratic) that are independent of all bidders' bids, which includes our reference points p RP and 0, giving rise to (8) MRC Quadratic(p˚" p RP ) and (9) MRC Quadratic(p˚" 0).
Subtracting those 9 rules from the 84 rules described in Table 3 leads to 75 new rules which we are the first to study in this paper. Some of these new rules we have designed by simply combining various ideas from prior work (combinations of metrics, weights, reference points, and MRC). However, 36 rules are based on the new weights we have introduced, p V CG and p M E , and we will show in Section 8 that the rules based on those weights perform particularly well. Note that our framework naturally lends itself to extensions via new metrics, weights, reference points, and arbitrary combinations thereof.
Methods
Approximate Bayes-Nash Equilibrium Calculation
To evaluate our rules in realistic settings where closed-form solutions for the bidders' BNE strategies do not exist or are intractable to derive analytically, we need a computational method for approximating the BNEs. Accordingly, we have developed an algorithm based on the approach by Lubin and Parkes (2009) and earlier work by Vorobeychik and Wellman (2008) . Pseudocode of the algorithm is provided in Appendix A.
Our algorithm is based on the general idea of Fictitious Play. The algorithm finds outcomes to games by iteratively computing the expected best response for a bidder given a set of current strategies for the other bidders. We simplify the problem by defining a fixed number of bins, three in our experiments, and assigning each bidder to a bin (small, medium, or large) depending on his value function. We then find a single strategy for each bin that is in expectation a best response to the other bidders play. After each iteration, we proceed forward with an affine combination of the best response and the previous strategy. In a BNE, no player (or bin) can improve his utility (in expectation) by playing his best response instead of the BNE strategy. Our algorithm converges if this criterion is met within an error of . Such an outcome is called a (multiplicative) -BNE, i.e., each player diverting from the -BNE can, in expectation, improve his utility by at most a factor of . Additionally, we ensure that the strategies in the approximated BNE are at most a constant factor δ away from the respective best response. We thus get an p , δq-BNE. More formally, we let br i ps˚iq denote agent i's best-response to the strategy profile s˚i of all other agents. To measure the distance between two strategies s i and s 1 i , we use the L 2 -norm ||s i´s 1 i || 2 . Definition 16 (Approximate Bayes-Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile s˚" ps1, . . . , snq is an p , δq-Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a sealed-bid auction if, for all bidders i, and all values functions v i
where the expectation in (20) is taken with respect to the distribution over the other bidders' value functions.
To validate the correctness of our approximate-BNE calculation algorithm, we have computed approximate BNEs for the settings presented in Section 5.2 where closed-form expressions are known from the literature. The results are shown in Table 4 , which are averages over 50 randomly initialized runs. We see that our algorithm is able to find approximate BNEs (with additive as well as multiplicative strategies) that are very close to the true BNEs. Table 4 : Here we compare theoretical BNE results against the BNE strategies obtained from our algorithm. These include the first-price single item auction (Krishna, 2002) , the uncorrelated LLG setting (with additive strategies) (Goeree and Lien, 2014) , and the correlated LLG setting (with multiplicative strategies) (Baranov, 2010) . Reported values are averages across 50 runs.
To further illustrate the use of our algorithm, we show in Figure 3 the results of an approximate BNE computation with multiplicative strategies for a more complicated, combinatorial setting with multi-minded bidders, where the bidders are grouped into three bins. Shown are the number of iterations on the x-axis, and the shade factors for each of the three bins on the y-axis. The calculation converges after 23 iterations and finds an approximate BNE with the Large bidders shading only a little (0.93), the Medium bidders shading a bit more (0.89), and the Small bidders shading very much (0.71). 
Choosing a Strategy Space for our Experiments
In the experiments we present in the next section, we only consider large settings for which no analytical BNE results are known (e.g., 10 bidders, 25 goods, combinatorial preferences, multi-minded bidders). Naturally, the optimal BNE strategies in these settings will be highly complex. To make the approximate BNE calculation computationally feasible we need to choose a reasonably restricted strategy space for our algorithm. For this paper, we limit ourselves to single-dimensional strategies to keep the computational run-time manageable (even with single-dimensional strategies, finding the approximate BNE for a single payment rule can take up to one day on a high-performance machine). We study both, (1) multiplicative as well as (2) additive shading strategies. With multiplicative (shading) strategies, a bidder's strategy is a shading factor in r0, 1s that he applies multiplicatively to all value reports on all bundles (i.e., shading all values down by the same factor). With additive shading strategies, a bidder's strategy is an additive factor in r0,´8s that he adds to all value reports on all bundles (where adding a negative number also corresponds to shading down his values). Overall, we obtain very consistent results (in terms of efficiency, fairness, incentives, and revenue) whether we study multiplicative or additive strategies. Thus, for the comparison of our payment rules we could look at the results for either multiplicative or additive strategies. However, because multiplicative strategies are somewhat easier to interpret (the strategies are always in r0, 1s and can be interpreted independent of the agents' values), we will discuss our findings by presenting the results for multiplicative strategies in the main body of the paper. The most important results for additive strategies are provided in Appendix F.
We note that in core-selecting auctions, there are reasons to analyze more complex strategies than those we use in our experiments. For example, Beck and Ott (2013) show that over-bidding strategies can sometimes be useful. Concretely, they show that by leveraging the core constraints, bidders may be able to decrease their own payment on bundles they expect to win, by bidding more than their true value on bundles they expect to loose. Somewhat orthogonally, Janssen and Karamychev (2013) show that bidders who want to drive up competitors' payments can use so-called "spiteful" bidding strategies in combinatorial auctions. This could help a bidder by causing the bidder's competition to exhaust their budget, or by making the competition overpay for spectrum, hurting the public perception of their position and thus e.g. their stock price. While we believe that such strategies would be very interesting to study, they are necessarily multi-dimensional, making the equilibrium finding problem significantly more computationally difficult. Thus, as multi-dimensional strategies are outside the scope of our already highly optimized and extremely complex equilibrium solver, we defer the analysis of such strategies to future work.
Domain Generators
For our experiments, we use two generators to create CA instances from which we evaluate the effectiveness of the payment rules. The first generator we use is the Regions distribution from the Combinatorial Auction Test Suite (CATS) (Leyton-Brown and Shoham, 2006) . CATS has many distributions, but most of them are not particularly suitable for evaluating core-selecting payment rules. Because Regions is based on the geographic allocation of assets, it is the closest match to a spectrum auction environment, where core-selecting payment rules have so far played the biggest role in practice. We therefore use Regions, with the default parameters (16 goods, 8 bidders).
However, we found that even when using the CATS Regions distribution, the average VCG-to-core distance of the auction instances was quite small (i.e., VCG is "almost" in the core). To have greater control over the structure and economic properties of the instances we evaluate, we also constructed our own domain generator based on the one in Lubin and Parkes (2009) , and presented in Appendix B. Because this generator produces three different classes of bidders, we call it the Tri-Modal Generator. We opted for a generator that explicitly produces this structure because this facilitates the economic interpretation of the results, in particular the bins (small, medium, large) to which we assign our bidders in our computational BNE algorithm.
Our generator is designed to be simple, but to still exhibit the key features of combinatorial spectrum auctions. Bidders in the auction are assigned a size, either small, medium or large. Each bidder is only interested in a subset of the goods and constructs a number of XOR bundle-bids by drawing uniform at random from this demand set a number of goods proportional to his assigned size. Bundles are given a value by summing over private per-good values, and then scaling by a factor that is exponential in the size of the bundle above the smallest one demanded by the bidder. We set this exponential to a slightly sub-additive factor, accounting for bidders having a decreasing marginal return for additional goods, once they are able to satisfy their basic business plan.
Reserve Prices
For a seller to set reasonable reserve prices, she must have good estimates of the bidders' values. Despite the difficulty of attaining such a distribution in practice, we want to use reserve prices in our experiments (not to increase revenue, which is not our focus in this paper, but to use them as reference points and weights). Towards this end, we begin by estimating the empirical distribution on bundle values by drawing a large number of bundle-bids from our domain generator. We then take the 20 thpercentile of our empirical bundle-value distribution as our bundle-specific reserve price. To validate this choice, we also evaluated the 10th, 30th and 50th percentile, and found that the 20 th -percentile produced both high fairness and revenue, which we therefore adopted for our experiments.
Results for Realistically-sized Combinatorial Auction Domains
In this section, we describe the results of our computational BNE analysis, comparing various payment rules according to their (a) efficiency, (b) incentives, (c) fairness, and (d) revenue. Here, we provide results that were produced using our Tri-Modal generator described in Section 7.3. The results are generally consistent with the results for the CATS Regions generator, but they are simply more pronounced for the Tri-Modal generator (which makes reading the results tables easier) than for the Regions generator, because Regions has a small average VCG-to-core distance. The corresponding results for the CATS Regions generator are provided in Appendix E. Table 5 lists our main results: we compare the various payment rules in our framework when we include the MRC objective, use VCG as the reference point, and adopt multiplicative strategies for the bidders. Results for alternative reference points are provided in Appendix D and additive strategies in Appendix F. In total, we have evaluated each of our 85 rules in eight different ways: four different settings (two domain generators, each with two different VCG-to-Core distances), and with both multiplicative and additive strategies. Computing the BNE for one rule requires approximately 13 hours on a high-performance machine (with 128 GB RAM, two Intel Xeon CPUs at 2.8 GHz, and 10 cores per CPU), with additional 2 hours of time subsequently spent when evaluating the nature of the BNE found by computing the outcome of 100, 000 additional game instances in order to produce our efficiency, fairness and revenue results. Across all rules, settings, and strategy spaces, this adds up to more than one year of compute with a single machine, though we have parallelized our computations on a large compute grid.
Efficiency analysis
The last column of Table 5 is efficiency, from which we can see that all of the rules achieve high efficiency. The lowest efficiency is achieved by the Pay-as-bid rule (98.2%), while all other payment rules lead to an efficiency of 99.4% or higher. Consequently, we immediately turn to our other criteria in evaluating the rules.
Incentive Analysis
Next, we consider our first main point of interest: the strategies we observe in BNE. We report the strategies for each of the "small", "medium" and "large" bidders in the second through fourth columns of Table 5 , as well as the overall "aggregate incentive" to deviate in the fifth column of Table 5 . As was described in Section 4.3, we characterize the latter by the Euclidean distance between truth-reporting and the observed strategies (normalized by value); we color code this column to make the results easier to read. For the MRC Quadratic rule, we observe that the strategies diverge significantly between the "small", "medium", and "large" bidders. The small bidders are forced to shade strongly (v S " .71v S ) while the medium and large bidders have significantly smaller shades (v M " .89v M andv L " .93v L ). Taken together, these induce a reasonably strong aggregate incentive to deviate at AI " 31.9.
Among the Large rules, this pattern is only made worse, with the small bidders shading even more (v S « .60v S ) and large bidders being almost truthful. This is expected, given that the Large rule aims to provide large bidders with their full VCG discount. This extreme shading by the small players causes the Large rules to have overall the poorest aggregate incentives with AI « 40.
We see that both the Small and Fractional rules are able to improve the incentives for the small players. In the best case, when using the p RP -Small rule, the small players' strategy is much closer to truth, atv S " .84v S . We note that it is not surprising that even the Small rule -which maximally benefits small players -cannot fully compensate for the headwind that small players must endure in combinatorial auctions: the relative distance to VCG is generally higher for small players and the core constraints often have a relatively higher effect on small bidders. Still, the improved incentive effect on small players (while not overly harming the incentives for the other players) yields a corresponding improvement to the aggregate incentives at AI " 23.9.
We further observe that the Fractional rule also leads to reasonably good incentives for the players compared to the Quadratic rule, but not quite as good as the Small rule. For example, for p M E -Fractional, the incentives to shade vary betweenv S " .80v S andv L " .92v L . But importantly, the maximal incentive to strategize (here by the small players) as well as the aggregate incentives to strategize are smaller under the p M E -Fractional than under the Quadratic rule at AI " 24.5.
Fairness analysis
We now turn to our second main point of interest: the comparison of our payment rules in terms of fairness. To do this, we begin by computing the fraction of VCG payoff obtained by each winner under the payment rule in each of our 100, 000 evaluation instances (shown in columns six through eight of Table 5 ).
We next capture two versions of the Gini coefficient for each rule. The first is the "Standard" Gini, calculated on the payoff obtained by each agent in our evaluation instances, as payoff is the natural analogy to "wealth" commonly used when calculating gini coefficients. We present these values in the ninth (and color-coded) column of Table 5 . Further, as described in Section 4.4, we believe that the fraction of VCG discount that each participant obtains is also an important reflection of their "fair" apportionment, and so we provide a "VCG"-based Gini in the tenth column (also color-coded). As we shall see, these two measures are remarkably consistent.
The MRC Quadratic rule has a Standard Gini of 47.5 and a VCG Gini of 60.2, which corresponds to its quite unequal distribution of fractions of VCG payoffs: the small players obtain 79% of their VCG payoff while the larger players obtain 106% of their VCG payoff. This is consistent with the motivating example we provided in the introduction, here now verified for a larger setting, and in BNE. Clearly, the MRC Quadratic rule favors the "large" bidders not only on a strategic basis but on a payoff basis as well.
Next we consider the weighted rules, starting with Large. The relative VCG payoffs under Large are even more divergent than under the Quadratic rule and consequently both Gini measures are even higher than under MRC Quadratic. Exactly the opposite occurs, though, under the Small rule, where the unfairness is ameliorated by explicitly favoring the "small" players. Looking at the fractions of VCG payoffs for the Small rule, we observe far greater consistency across bidder sizes than for the Quadratic and Large rules. This translates to the lowest overall Standard and VCG Gini scores of only 40.9 and 51.3 respectively for p RP -Small.
Finally, we turn to the Fractional rule which, when equipped with ∆ for weights, seeks to provide the same fraction of VCG payoff across all bidders ex-post. While there is no guarantee that targeting optimal fairness ex-post will result in a fair rule in equilibrium, we find that Fractional does in fact do extremely well, obtaining a miminum VCG Gini of 52.7 for p RP -Fractional (and a small Standard Gini of 43.5), only slightly higher than that achieved by Small.
Choosing Weights. For each of the weighted rules, we have considered four different weights. The first weight we report is the VCG discount ∆, the weight originally proposed by Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso (2001) . While one might imagine that VCG discount is highly correlated with bidder value, in many domains this correlation is actually low. Indeed, we see in Table 5 that ∆ performs surprisingly badly, and in particular is outperformed by all other weights for the Small and Fractional rules.
Next, we consider our new weights p V CG . We find that using p V CG significantly improves upon using ∆, but is itself dominated, e.g., by reserve prices p RP . In particular, we find that p RP can be extremely effective as weights, for example in the Small rule producing a VCG Gini that is 3.8 lower than that with p V CG weights.
However, in practice, high quality reserve prices will often not be available. Fortunately, our results also demonstrate that for these cases, our new marginal economy p M E weights perform just as well: they produce essentially the same fairness, revenue and efficiency as p RP , but without requiring knowledge of bidders' value distributions. 8.4. The VCG-to-Core Distance: Fairness (and Revenue)
Core-selecting pricing rules are often put forward as a way to raise additional revenue in CAs over that available under VCG. While it is true that ex post such rules do raise additional revenue, in equilibrium, bidder strategies can more than compensate for this. As is evident in our results, it is easy for core-selecting rules to produce little or no additional revenue over VCG in equilibrium. For example, in Table 5 the increase in revenue over VCG was on average between 2% and 7%. However, even when the revenue rise is small (or even non-existant), practitioners may still want to use core-selecting rules -not for their revenue properties -but because of the anti-collusion property that the core guarantees. In many real-world settings, providing this guarantee (and avoiding the potential lawsuits that arise from not having it) is more important than the total revenue raised. Ultimately, if high revenue is a concern for the market designer, then techniques such as well-chosen reserve prices should be employed. This said, we want to be able to evaluate how much revenue the various rules produce in equilibrium. To get a handle on this, we first note that the expected distance between VCG and the MRC at true values is a property of the domain, and represents the potential revenue increase of the core over VCG if bidders remained truthful. In equilibrium, the strategic behavior of bidders will reduce the revenue obtained -and the particulars of the payment rule used will mediate how much such reduction occurs. Neither the CATS Regions generator nor our own generator produce instances with a particularly large Core to VCG distance. Accordingly, we stratify the instances produced by the generators, and consider a domain comprised of only the highest quintile of instances when looking at the truthful distance between the core and VCG. Table 6 provides results of this type for the Tri-Modal domain. We observe that the overall pattern of the results is similar to that seen in Table 5 . However, because more revenue is available in this setting, comparing the revenue amongst the rules is easier. We can see that Large produces the most revenue, but only through extreme unfairness. Small produces significantly less revenue than MRC Quadratic, but is very fair.
Overall, we see that the Fractional rule, especially in conjunction with marginal economy weights, is a good all-around performer. It produces the same revenue as MRC Quadratic, but with somewhat better efficiency and significantly better fairness.
Minimum Revenue Core (MRC)
All of the results presented so far are for rules that choose payments from the MRC, as suggested by Day and Raghavan (2007) . We have also studied the effect of MRC on the BNE outcome and include a version of Table 5 created without the MRC criterion in Appendix C. Overall, the results with and without MRC are very similar. While relaxing the MRC constraint does change the equilibrium properties slightly for each payment rule, we do not observe any systematic shifts in revenue, efficiency, fairness, or in the strategies. This seems to suggest that, in Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the effect of the MRC constraint is relatively minor. Moreover, we find that the Fractional rule with marginal economy weights remains a good choice in either case.
Alternative Reference Points
Additionally, we have also investigated the effect of replacing VCG as the reference point for our rules with our reserve prices, as detailed in Appendix D. When using reserve prices for the reference point, we observe that the differences among our rules narrows. This matches intuition, as the high-quality reserve prices we employ are "doing the work" such that our rules' weightings have less of an effect. This implies that if good reserve prices are available, using them may be beneficial, although this is often not the case. Importantly, however, we observe that the ranking of the various rules remains the same even when using the alternate reference point. Thus, in the case where reserve prices are being employed, the Small and the Fractional rules both remain better choices than the Quadratic rule.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the efficiency, fairness, incentive and revenue properties of various payments rules for core-selecting CAs. Our main focus were the aggregate incentives and the fairness of these rules. We have then sought core-selecting payment rules that perform well by these two measures. We have first derived the BNE of the VCG-Discount-Small and the VCG-Discount-Large rules in the LLG setting, and compared their efficiency, incentives, fairness and revenue with that of the Quadratic rule. In this setting we found that the Small rule dominates the Quadratic rule along all four dimensions.
We have then defined a new framework covering a class of 85 possible rules. We then analyzed all of our rules using a novel approximate BNE calculation method for a realistically-sized combinatorial auction setting (25 items and 10 bidders, combinatorial preferences, multi-minded bidders). We found that all the rules we have evaluated had near perfect efficiency, but the rules varied considerably in terms of their incentive effects, fairness properties and revenue. In particular, we have found that the rule most commonly used in practice, the Quadratic rule, strongly favors larger bidders (in terms of incentives and payoffs) and is thus unfair towards small bidders, while the Small rule is the fairest rule.
However, one issue with Small is that it is itself asymmetric between players: small bidders are effectively facing VCG, while the "large" players are effectively playing in a pay-as-bid auction. We find that this asymmetry can help correct for the differential market power that large and small participants have a priori. However, in many settings such differential treatment may not be acceptable, depending on the prevailing policy and law. Fortunately, we have found that the Fractional rule provides nearly the same good incentive and fairness properties as the Small rule.
To power weight-based rules like Fractional we have proposed two new weights, including Marginal Economy weights, which we find to be almost as effective as reserve prices, but with much lower informational requirements. Moreover, we find that the MRC, typically included in today's coreselecting CAs, has only a minor effect in equilibrium.
Overall, we find that the Quadratic rule is not necessarily the optimal choice for CAs. Instead, considering all of our experimental results, we recommend using the Marginal-Economy-Fractional rule, which has the same (or even slightly better) high efficiency and revenue properties as the Quadratic rule, but significantly improves upon it in terms of fairness and aggregate incentives.
In future work, we plan to expand upon the space of strategies that we evaluate in equilibrium, including multi-dimensional (additive and multiplicative) strategies. Additionally, we believe that even more sophisticated heuristics may be developed along the lines of the marginal economy weights we have presented, by using machine learning techniques to interpolate the marginal economy values. The fundamental approach we take to solving for the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium is that of Fictitious Play. This algorithm finds outcomes to games by iteratively computing the best response for a player given a set of current strategies for the other players. After each such iteration, we update each player's strategy using a linear combination of the best response and the current current strategy, i.e we proceed forward with a "damped" version of the best response. Traditionally, such an algorithm would identify a unique strategy for every bidder in the mechanism. However, even with single-dimensional bidder strategies, computing such an equilibrium in our setting is intractable for domains with large numbers of bidders. Consequently, following Lubin and Parkes (2009), we simplify the problem defining a fixed number of bins, three in our experiments, and assigning each bidder to a bin. We then find a single single strategy per bin, and apply it to all bidders therein. This enables us to compute approximate equilibria, even in games containing many bidders.
APPENDIX
A. The BNE Calculation Algorithm
For this approach to be effective, "similar" bidders must be assigned to the same bin. While there are many ways to define similarity, we have opted to assign bidders according to their value: our bins are thus defined as the terciles of bidder value ('small', 'medium' and 'large') . This would be enough if our bidders were single-minded, i.e. interested in only a single bundle of goods. However, as our bidders are multi-minded, we must define what we mean by their value. We assign them to bins according to the 90th quantile of their value across all of their bundles.
In a BNE no player (or bin) can improve his utility by playing a best-response instead of the BNE strategy. Our algorithm converges if this criterion is met within an error of . Such an outcome is called an -BNE, i.e., each player diverting from the -BNE can, in expectation, gain at most utility.
For some mechanisms in practice, some players may have utilities that are relatively inelastic with respect to their bids. A sample response utility graph for such a domain is presented in Figure 4 . As a consequence, it is possible for the -BNE condition to be met even while the underlying strategies are not yet stable, because all strategies within the utility plateau are within the support. To account for this, we slightly augment the convergence criterion of our algorithm to require that not only the maximum utility change between the current strategy and the best response is less than , but also that the maximum change in strategy is less than δ P R.
Pseudocode for our approach is provided in Algorithm 1. Our algorithm has a large number of parameters most of which involve a trade-off between validity and runtime. In our experiments we used: nBidders " 60, nSamples " 30, nGridP oints " 50, nBins " 3, " .01, δ " 0.015. To increase the validity of our algorithm we run a final best-response round with increased parameters (e.g. nBidders " 120, nSamples " 60, nGridP oints " 100) and only terminate if the convergence criteria are still met. Psudocode for our Tri-Modal generator is provided in Algorithm 2. The generator is careful to capture the property that bidders typically demand only a subset of all goods, producing XOR bundle bids only for sets of goods drawn from this "demandment" set (i.e., demandment : buyer :: endowment : seller). Value for these bundles is calculated as a linear combination of individual good prices, but scaled by a quantity that is exponential in the size of the bundle over the smallest bundle the bidder bids upon. This enables us to model decreasing returns for additional goods, once an bidder's basic business plan has been met.
For our experiments, we setup the parameters of the generator as follows: m " 25, n " 9, P M " .3, P H " .2, dSizes " r3, 9, 13s, nBundles " r2, 4, 8s, bSizeL " r1, 4, 7s, bSizeH " r2, 6, 9s, γ " .97.
ALGORITHM 2: The Tri-Modal Generator Data: m, n, P M , P H , dSizes, nBundles, bSizeL, bSizeH, γ Result: n bidder bids, each consisting of XOR bundles for each bidder do size := L with 1-P M -P H , M with P M and H with P H demandment := draw dSizesrsizes goods uniform Draw private values U r0, 1s, for each g P demandment for i in nBundlesrsizes do Draw bSizeris from U rbSizeLrsizes, bSizeHrsizess bGoodsris := Draw bSizeris goods from demandment bV alLinris := ř gPbGoodsris privatergs end sSize := min i bSizeris for i in nBundlesrsizes do bV alN onLinris := bV alLin¨γ bSizeris´sSize Assign bidder bGoodsris at value bV alN onLinris as XOR bundle end end C. Results Without MRC Day and Raghavan (2007) argued for selecting payments that are in the minimum-revenue-core (MRC). In this section we investigate the effect of removing this constraint and select prices that are, perhaps, not in the MRC. We see that the results are very similar to the results with MRC. The MRC constraint does not seem to have a significant effect on the bidder's strategies, nor on fairness or revenue.
D. Results For Alternative Reference Points
Multiple authors (Erdil and Klemperer, 2010; Day and Cramton, 2012) have investigated non-VCG reference points that are independent of the bidders' bids, with the goal of minimizing incentives for strategizing. The zero reference point does not appear to perform well. The reserve reference point performs requires sellers to posses significant distributional information on bidders values. Consequently, we believe that VCG remains the most promising reference point of those we have studied. E. Results from the CATS Regions Generator F. Results For Additive Strategies
